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1. Introduction  
For many decades and throughout much of the world, the tension between industrial 
pollution and households has been crucial in urban economies.  Some cities, e.g., Washington, 
D.C., have introduced green buffer zones near densely populated areas while others have 
intermixed industry and households (e.g., Lima, Shanghai, Bangkok, Moscow, etc.)  What cities 
have come to recognize is that space can and should be used as a means of controlling pollution.  
Separating polluter and pollutee typically reduces pollution damages but leads to increased 
commuting costs. When pollution damages are low relative to transport costs, separation into 
industrial and residential areas is uneconomic and the uniform distribution of industry and 
housing over space is economic. However, above a certain threshold, the division of housing 
and industry into separate residential and industrial areas becomes desirable. As pollution 
damages relative to transport costs rise, increasing separation into larger areas becomes more 
efficient.  This paper focuses on the role of space in the control of pollution externalities.  
Accordingly, we concentrate on pollution from stationary sources and avoid dealing with 
congestion and vehicle emissions for which separation by space does not reduce damages.1 
The existing papers on spatial pollution from stationary sources (Tietenberg [20,21,22], 
Henderson [5,6,7], Hochman and Ofek [9], and Baumol and Oates [4]) have the common 
weakness that they all take the pattern of land use between housing and industry as fixed, 
assuming that housing is in one zone and industry is in another.  This paper relaxes this 
assumption, treating as endogenous the pattern of land use.  Specifically, this paper 
characterizes the optimal resource allocation and joint location of polluting firms and their 
                                                 
1 Note that this applies only to commuting inside the residential and industrial zones. Travel on interstates and 
freeways near residential areas can be considered stationary and our results apply. Indeed, the increasingly 
common bypasses around highly populated areas separate expressways and dwellings, resulting in green buffer 
zones between the expressways and residential areas.    3 
workers’ housing around a circle, as well as policies that decentralize the optimum. To 
eliminate those factors which are not essential for isolating the role of land use in pollution 
control we: i) specify a city without a predetermined center; ii) assume a constant returns to 
scale production function so that production processes are not the source of any endogenous 
separation and agglomeration of housing and industry; iii) assume a ring-shaped city to avoid 
dealing with edge-of-city effects; and iv) assume all workers to be identical and all firms to be 
identical to avoid the complications introduced by heterogeneity. Accordingly, if pollution does 
not exist, a uniform layout of the city emerges with factories and houses intermixed. 
In studies where agglomeration is due to positive production externalities such as external 
scale economies, (e.g. see Lucas [10], Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg [11] and Rossi-Hansberg 
[18]), an industrial zone is located in the midst of a residential zone and intensities of land use 
increase with proximity to the joint center of the two zones. Such a layout is the result of a 
balance between two forces of attraction operating on two land uses: the primary attraction 
between firms due to scale economies and the attraction between households and industry 
caused by commuting costs.  
Contrary to the above studies, in our model of pollution externalities the spatial layout results 
from a balance between two opposing forces: one is the repulsion of households from polluting 
industry and the other is the attraction between households and industry caused by increasing-
with-distance commuting costs. The balance between the attraction and repulsion forces leads to 
the agglomeration of the two land uses into a set of alternating industrial and residential zones. 
The intensity of land use in each zone increases with proximity to the center of the zone where 
the density peaks.  Furthermore, depending on the specific parameters, empty buffer zones may 
exist between the industrial and the residential zones.     4 
Additionally, in our model for every specified level of commuting costs, there can be an 
infinite number of local optima but only one global optimum. When commuting costs are very 
low, the global optimum entails a single industrial zone and a single residential zone.  When 
commuting costs rise above a certain threshold, the global optimum changes to an allocation 
with two (or more) industrial zones in each of which industry agglomerates, and two (or more) 
residential zones in each of which households agglomerate.  As commuting costs continue to 
rise, successive thresholds are reached, each with more industrial zones and an equal number of 
additional residential zones, until a final threshold is reached above which the global optimum 
is a uniform allocation of mixed residential and industrial land uses without commuting. 
We also investigate decentralization of the global optimum.  Spatially differentiated 
Pigouvian taxes per unit emission levied on industrial polluters will not generally support the 
optimum in either the short run (fixed household and firm locations) or the long run 
(endogenously determined locations).  Whether or not the model's solution entails separating 
land uses, only if the dispersion function is linear in emissions or if locations are predetermined 
and fixed and the dispersion function is convex in emissions will the typical Pigouvian taxes 
offered in the literature (Baumol and Oates [4], Rausser and Lapan [17] Spulber [19]) be 
optimal.  Henderson [5] showed the insufficiency of Pigouvian taxes, proposing an additional 
lump-sum tax along with the Pigouvian tax.  Hochman and Ofek [9] proved that the optimum 
can be achieved by levying a tax on each unit of industrial land equal to the spatial aggregate of 
added damages contributed by that unit of land. In a non-spatial model, Polinsky [16] 
demonstrated the failure of the Pigouvian tax and also derived a tax equal to the added damages 
caused by a firm.  Our analysis shows, under more general conditions than considered in 
previous papers, that a spatially differentiated added-damages tax is sufficient to achieve the    5 
global optimum. We also argue that with our specifications a laissez-faire solution will always 
yield an inefficient allocation without zoning and without commuting. 
  The following section presents the model.  Section 3 specifies the social optimum 
problem.  Section 4 derives and investigates conditions for a local optimum, and the price 
system that supports it.  To gain insight and intuitive understanding, section 5 investigates a 
number of special cases using bid-rent analysis.  Section 6 characterizes the local optima where 
the number of zones is predetermined, based on the interpretation of the special cases, and 
section 7 describes the global optimum.  Section 8 presents several concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Model Specification  
Assume a ring-shaped featureless strip of land of unit width.  Let L be the circumference of 
the circle equidistant from the two boundary circles of the ring (see Fig. 1); as a result, L is also 
the total area of the ring.  This circle is the location axis in the ring.  The point due west on this 
ring is arbitrarily chosen as the origin.  The clockwise distance from the origin is designated by 
x; x=0 and x = L are the two coordinates of the origin and0  x  L.  Only circumferential 
travel is costly.    6 
 
Firms produce a (numéraire) composite good, using a constant-returns-to-scale, neoclassical 
production technology, with land and labor inputs and pollution emissions as a by-product.  In 
particular, output per unit distance at x is  )) ( ), ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ), ( ) ( ), ( ( x e x n f x a x e x a x n x a x a F = , 
where a(x) is the proportion of land occupied by industry at x, n(x) the number of workers per 
unit of industrial land at x, e(x) the quantity of emissions per unit of industrial land at x, and    7 
)) ( ), ( ( x e x n f the output per unit of industrial land at x, where the intensive (per unit land) 
production function   ) , ( e n f  fulfills  f (n,e) < f(n,e)for  1 >  . 
Each household commutes with transport cost per unit distance of t units of composite good, 
to a firm to which it supplies one unit of labor.  A household derives utility from land and the 
composite good, and disutility from the pollution concentration at its residence.  In particular, 
the household at x receives utility U(h(x), z(x), c(x)), where h(x) is lot size, z(x) composite 
good, and c(x) the concentration of pollution; the utility function is quasi-concave in h, z, and –
c. 
The economy is open in the sense that households migrate freely between the economy and 
the rest of the world so that 
(1)     U(h(x), z(x), c(x))= U0 
at all settled locations, where U0 is the exogenous utility level. 
In general, the concentration of pollution at x is a functional depending on the spatial 
distribution of emissions, characterized by e(y) and a(y), as well as all y and x , i.e., 
() x y y a y e C x c , , ) ( , ) ( ) ( = , where y is another index of location and   around a function 
denotes the entire range of the function's values, i.e., for all  L y   0 . To make the model 
analytically tractable, we make three simplifying assumptions: 
i)  () () () ( ) (), (), , () , Ce y a y yx Ca y D e yxy =  ,  
where D() is the pollution dispersion function.  According to this assumption doubling the land 
area at y devoted to industry has the same effect on pollution concentration at x as 
doublingD().    8 
ii)     () () () ()
0 () , () () ,
L
Ca y D e yxy a y D e yxy d y  =   .   
This assumption means that the pollution concentration at x is additive2 in the pollution 
contributions from different y. 
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This specification allows pollution emissions at y to affect the concentration of pollution at x 
differently, depending on whether pollution travels clockwise to x from  [] () x x y L ,   2    or 
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2 As shown in Arrow et al. [3] and the references contained therein, economies or diseconomies of scale can exist 
in the assimilative powers of the environment when the density of concentrations at a given location gets close to a 
breakdown point of biological systems.  This means that, contrary to this assumption, concentration at a given 
location is not just the addition of contributions from different sources, but is a function of concentration and 
emissions levels at different locations.  Indeed, regulatory agencies have been employing complex nonlinear 
simulation models to represent the emission/dispersion process (see, for example, Allegrini and De Santis [1] and 
the NTIS, US Department of Commerce [15]). 
  Our specification does not allow the contribution of pollution at y to the pollution concentration at x to 
depend in a non-linear fashion on the emissions at some other location z (as did the specification of Tietenberg [22] 
and Henderson [5]).  We address later whether the policy results we derive are affected by our simplifying 
assumptions concerning the form of c  (). 
     9 
Analogous properties are assumed for D
  (), with  y – x replacing x – y, and it is furthermore 
assumed that D
+ e,0 () = D
 e,0 () .  
The simplest reasonable concentration function would have cx () = ay ()
0
L
 ey () gx y () dy, 
where g  () is the distance-decay function. Our more general specification allows pollution to be 
directionally asymmetric, the pollution contribution from y to depend not only on the total 
emissions at y but also on the intensity of emissions. 
3.  The Social Optimum Problem 
We are now in a position to set up the social optimum problem.  The objective function is net 
city surplus, the amount of the composite good left over after commuting expenses and 
consumption of the composite goods by the city’s workers.  This is maximized subject to the 
open city constraint (1), land utilization constraints, and constraints describing the technologies 
of pollution concentration (2) and commuting. 
We start with the commuting technology.  We impose as an assumption an obvious property 
of the social optimum that cross commuting does not occur.  Thus, all households living at a 
particular location commute to work in the same direction.  Define Tx ()  to be the number of 
workers who cross x clockwise on the journey to work or minus the number who cross 




the number of residents between x and x + dx , where b(x) is the proportion of residential land at 
x, minus a(x)n(x)dx, the number of workers there.  With counterclockwise commuting, 
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however, Tx ()  is measured negatively with counterclockwise commuting, for travel in either 
direction: 
(4a)      ) ( ) (
) (
) (
) ( x n x a
x h
x b
x T  = & , 
 where a dot above a function indicates differentiation with respect to x, with 
(4b)       () () 0 0 = = L T T                     
T 0 () = TL ()  since the total number of households in the city equals the number of workers, and 
T 0 () = 0 forces the origin to be a point not crossed by workers (this entails no loss of generality 
since, as shown later, every solution has at least two points commuters do not cross).  Eqs. (4a) 
and (4b) together imply the commuting constraint: 
















The relevant land-utilization constraints are  
(5a,b,c)  a(x) + b(x)1 0     ax ()  0   bx ()  0; 
when the first  constraint is not binding, at least some land at x is vacant.  
Net city surplus is given by 
(6)       
0 (,)
L b
Sa f n e z T t d x
h
 =     . 
The first term on the RHS is the aggregate production of the composite good, the second the 
aggregate consumption of the composite good by the city’s residents, and the third the 
aggregate commuting expenses, which are calculated as the number of commuters who travel    11 
across the interval  x,x +dx [] , Tx () dx, times t, commuting cost per unit distance, and summed 
over locations.  
     Maximization of S in (6), subject to (1), (2), (4a), and (5), with (4b) as terminal conditions, 
provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for parochial3 efficiency. In the next section we 
describe and interpret these conditions, which constitute a subset of the necessary conditions for 
Pareto optimality for the economy as a whole (see Hochman [8]). Clearly, since we are dealing 
with a non-convex problem some of the variables might have corner solutions and there might 
be more than one such local optimum.  These issues are addressed in the determination of the 
global optimum (see Sections 6 and 7).   
According to the Second Welfare Theorem, any Pareto optimal allocation with convex 
production functions and quasi-concave utility functions can be decentralized as a price quasi-
equilibrium with transfers (see Mas-Colell et al. [12], Proposition 16.D.1).  In the presence of 
externalities this means that competitive markets support the optimum with government 
intervention limited to corrective taxes and lump sum income redistributions. In the rest of the 
paper we shall consider allocations that are locally optimal. And when we discuss 
decentralization of a local optimum, we shall use the term supporting price system to refer to a 
price vector that supports the local optimum allocation under minimal government 
intervention.4 
 
4. The Local Optimum Solution and its Supporting Price System  
                                                 
3 The efficiency concept we employ—which we term parochial efficiency—is only for our city, not for the rest of 
the economy.  Parochial efficiency is necessary for global efficiency. Note that in our model residents have no 
unearned income and all the profits of the city go to non-residents.   
4 There are three groups of agents in our economy: households, firms, and a government or city developer. The 
government/city developer owns the land and sets the tax rates, receiving land rents and tax revenue as income. 
The rest of the economy is competitive with households and firms being price-takers. Thus, we define a 
competitive equilibrium with taxes to be a gross-of-tax price vector (over emissions, wage, and land rents at 
different locations) such that: i) each household maximizes its utility subject to its budget constraint; ii) each firm 
maximizes its profit; and iii) land and labor markets clear.    12 
The constrained maximization problem described above, as well as the necessary conditions 
for a local optimum, is given in Appendix A. In this section, we present and interpret each 
condition in turn and indicate its implications for market decentralization. 
•  Employment 
If  ) (x   represents the co-state variable corresponding to T(x) in the commuter equation 
of motion (4a), then  ) (x   is the social cost of placing a household at x.  From the 
optimization condition (7), employment is determined by setting the marginal productivity 
of labor equal to  ) (x  , i.e. 
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The fact that a(x) multiplies the expression in (7) means that the equality of the expression 
in the brackets to zero must hold only where industry is located (not necessarily 
exclusively). 
Choosing optimally the number of commuters yields 
(8)             () () () t x T x sign   =  & , 
where 






















The function  () () x T sign  is constant as long as T(x) does not change its sign.  Therefore, 
along a segment where the sign of T(x) remains constant, (8) indicates that ) (x   is a 
linear function of x and increases (decreases) by t per unit distance. Thus  ) (x   is the 
shadow wage at locations of employment and in locations where industry does not exist 
) (x   equals the shadow wage minus commuting costs.    13 
Let w(x) be the local net earnings (LNE) at location x in the supporting market 
solution.  In a location where an industry is sited, w(x) is the wage rate, and in a location 
where there is no industry, w(x) is the wage rate where the household works minus 
commuting cost to the workplace. It follows that w(x)=(x).  
•  Residential Land 
(10)  () () () ()() .   0 = b   , 0   ; / x x x x x U U z h μ μ μ    =  
Note that (x) is the multiplier on the land constraint (5a), and is interpreted as the shadow 
(land) rent at location x and μ x ()  is the slack variable for b(x) in (5b).  Thus, (10) states that, at 
location x, the marginal rate of substitution between land in residential use and the composite 
good, which can be interpreted as the rent on land in residential use, equals the shadow rent 
when at least some land there is in residential use, and is less than the shadow rent otherwise.    
Define rx ()  to be the land rent in the supporting price system.  It follows from (10) that  
rx () =  x ()  at residential locations. 
•  Household Budget Constraint 
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Eq. (11) states that at all residential locations, the (net-of-commuting-cost) social benefit of 
locating a household there, () x  , equals the social opportunity cost of doing so.  In the 
corresponding market equilibrium, the equation is the household budget constraint, that the 
household’s income net of commuting cost equals its expenditure on residential land and the 
composite good. 
• Pollution concentration 





.    14 
Eq. (12) indicates that (x), the shadow price of pollution concentration at x or alternatively 
the marginal damage of pollution concentration there, equals minus the population density times 
the marginal rate of substitution between pollution concentration and the composite good.  
• Pollution Emissions 
(13a)     ax ()f2 x ()  Mx () [] = 0,    
where 






 +  =


+ +   , , 1 1
2
2   . 
Mx ()  is the marginal damage from pollution emitted at x.  A unit increase of pollution emitted 
at x augments the concentration at y by D 1
i e, y  x () , i=+ or –.  Mx ()  is obtained by 
multiplying this increase in pollution concentration at y by (y), the marginal damage caused 
by a unit concentration there, and summing over all possible y.  Thus, (13a) states that at all 
industrial locations the damage from a unit increase in emissions equals the value of the 
additional output created.  In the supporting price system, M(x) equals the Pigouvian tax at x. 
• Industrial Land  
(14a)  ()() [] ()() () () () x x x Q x n x x e x n f    =    ,  ; (x) 0, (x)a(x)= 0, 
where  ) (x  is the slack variable for a(x) in (5c), and 
(14b)   Q(x) = (y)D










is the additional damage caused by the total emissions from a unit area of land at x.  The first 
term on the left-hand side of (14a) is industrial output per unit of land and the second the wage    15 
bill.  The first term on the right-hand side of (14a) is the shadow price of the land utilization 
constraint (5a). That (x) is non-negative requires that the left-hand side of (14a) not exceed 
(x), which in turn must fulfill  
(15)       x ()  0;   x () 1 ax ()  bx () [] = 0. 
Thus, (14) states that at all industrial locations, land rent equals residual income (revenue less 
the wage bill). 
If in the supporting equilibrium Q(x) is levied as a tax per unit of industrial land and there is 
no Pigouvian tax imposed, at all locations with industry(x) equals the land rent r(x).5  In order 
to satisfy (13a), however, at first glance it appears that M(x) should be levied as a per unit 
emission tax, and that only when the dispersion functions are linearly homogeneous in e is the 
tax burden the same in the two cases. The following proposition resolves this apparent 
difficulty. 
Proposition 1:  To achieve efficiency in a market economy by taxing pollution emissions, a 
tax per unit of industrial land must be levied at every industrial location.  This tax must 
equal the added damages caused by the pollution emissions from this unit of land Q(x). 
Proof:  If an industrial producer pays Q(x) for emitting e(x) per unit land, wages of w(x)n(x), 




= M(e(x)).  
Corollary 1:  Each local optimal allocation has a supporting equilibrium with its own price 
system and corrective pollution taxes; so too does the global optimal allocation. 
                                                 
5 Note that in the supporting equilibrium wages are the only source of income of residents and land rents and 
proceeds from taxes go to nonresidents.      16 
In subsequent sections we shall use the supporting price system and the supporting 
equilibrium relations together with the optimum relations to characterize the global optimum.  
The key elements of the supporting equilibrium can be insightfully expressed in terms of the 
industrial and residential bid-rent functions at the optimum.  Specifically: 
Definition 1: DefineRI x () , the industrial bid-rent function, as 
(16)  () ()() ( ) ()() () x Q x n x x e x n f x R     , 1 ,   
where n(x), e(x), ) (x   and Q(x) are evaluated at a local optimum. 
This bid-rent function follows from (14) and indicates the maximum amount industry can 
pay for land at x without suffering losses when Q(x) in (14b) is imposed as a tax per unit of 
industrial land. 
Definition 2: Given c(·),  ()   , and U0 , define Rh  (), the household or residential bid-rent 
function, as 
(17)       ()
()()
() ()
() () () () () 0 , max . . , , h zxhx
xz x
Rx s t U h xz xc x U
hx

 = . 
From (10), Rh x () =
Uh x ()
Uz x ()
.  Rh(x)  is the maximum amount a household can afford to pay per 
unit of land, consistent with achieving utility U0. 
  Using equations (14) and (16) we obtain  
(18)  RI(x) r(x),  RI = r(x)  a(x) > 0. 
Similarly, from equations (10), (11) and (17),  
(19)   Rh(x) r(x),  Rh(x)= r(x) b(x) > 0. 
Equations (18) and (19) imply that an activity (production or consumption) takes place at a 
given location if and only if its bid rent there equals the market land rent.  Finally, from (18) 
and (19) the land rent r(x) can be determined by    17 
(20)        r(x) = max 0, Rh(x), RI(x) [] .   
The above definitions and relations imply the following bid-rent rule6 :  
Lemma 1 (Bid-rent Rule): Consider the residential and industrial bid-rent functions at a 
local optimum. Near a point of intersection of the two functions, only the land use with the 
larger derivative (with respect to x) of its bid-rent function is located immediately clockwise of 
the intersection point and only the other land use is located counterclockwise of it.  If the two 
derivatives are equal at the point of intersection, the two bid-rent functions coincide in a 
neighborhood of this point and housing and industry may coexist there. Locations where both 
bid rents are negative are empty buffer zones. 
The proof is provided in Appendix B (available on the internet). 
Corollary 2:  Pigouvian taxes are distortive when D110. 
The proof is based on two principles: First, that the marginal payment per unit of emission e 
is the same and optimal under the two tax regimes (see Proposition 1); and second, that total 
emission payments at a particular location are different in the two tax regimes when D110, 
implying that the industrial bid-rent function under Pigouvian taxation is not optimal. Thus, if 
the industry is located optimally (e.g. by zoning regulations), its emissions are optimal in the 
two tax regimes. However, the allocation of land between industry and residence can be 
suboptimal if only Pigouvian corrective taxes are used.   
To clarify this result, consider the case of D11<0.  Then Q> eM, which implies that levying a 
Pigouvian emissions' tax, M(x), is insufficient to support the optimum.  For a solution in which 
industry and housing are intermixed and the Pigouvian tax eM is levied, the industrial bid-rent 
function rises above its optimal value, which in turn causes r, the land rent, to be too high as 
well. Since r, a supporting price, is higher than its optimal value, the allocation supported is not 
                                                 
6 See proof in Appendix B.     18 
optimal. In this event, in each location more land is allocated to the industry than in the 
optimum and less land is allocated to housing.   
  For the same situation, i.e., D 11 < 0 and the Pigouvian tax eM levied, but with residential 
and industrial land separated, once again the industrial bid-rent function and hence land rents 
are higher than their optimal values, but now only in the industrial area.  This leads to a larger-
than-optimal industrial zone, and a residential zone which is smaller and more heavily polluted 
than optimal. 7   
 When  0 11 > D  (and hence  eM Q < ) under the Pigouvian tax the industrial bid-rent 
function is lower than optimal.  Whether the land uses coexist at the same location or are 
separated, industry occupies less land, produces less output and pays lower wages than at the 
optimum.8 When  0 11 = D , then  eM Q =  and the allocation is optimal in the two tax regimes.  
How robust is the optimality of the per unit land corrective tax Q(x) introduced in 
Proposition 1?  From (14) it can be seen that its optimality hinges on the assumptions of 
constant returns to scale in production and the additivity of the dispersion function.  When these 
assumptions are relaxed, we conjecture that the corrective tax still equals the pollution damages 
                                                 
7 Henderson [5] has shown that in a spatial setting over the short run, Pigouvian taxes are efficient when the 
dispersion function is weakly convex in emissions D 11  0 () .  In a non-spatial model, Spulber [19] and Baumol and 
Oates [4] have shown that Pigouvian taxes provide the proper incentive for firms to produce the optimal output in 
the short run by using the optimal mix of inputs. Spulber has also argued that when the damage function is convex 
in emissions, Pigouvian taxes provide the proper incentives for entry and exit of firms in the long run.  However, 
Pigouvian taxes fail to achieve efficiency in our spatial framework because the generated externality does not cause 
the actual damages.  The emissions are the direct external effects of the production process, but what causes the 
damages are concentrations. Concentrations are created by emissions from different sources via non-linear 
(dispersion) functions.  It is clear from equations (14) that if  (y)  could be levied as a tax per unit of concentration 
contributed by the firm, efficiency would be attained.  This means that Pigouvian taxes are efficient when levied on 
concentrations rather than on emissions.  However, producers create emissions, and only when the relation between 
emissions and concentrations is linear can taxes on emissions be optimal.  Accordingly, a necessary condition for 
Pigouvian taxes to be effective is that the accumulation process of concentrations from different sources be additive 
in emissions, the external effect itself.  This will occur only when  D 11=0, a result rarely satisfied (see footnote 1). 
8 This claim seems more plausible in view of Polinsky’s results [16].    19 
added by the firm, i.e. total pollution damages with the firm’s emissions minus pollution 
damages without it, but that the unit of taxation is the firm.9 
5. Laissez Faire and Special Cases10 
Thus far, we have derived necessary conditions for a local optimum.  The remainder of the 
paper explores how the spatial structure of the global optimum changes as t, the unit commuting 
cost, increases.  This section concentrates on special cases. Section 5.1, depicting the laissez-
faire allocation, is a detour from the investigation of the social optimum. Section 5.2 provides 
some preliminary definitions, and section 5.3 considers three special cases with one extreme 
parameter value, which give insight into the economic determinants of the globally optimal 
spatial structure.  In section 6 we examine how an increase in unit commuting costs t affects the 
solution with a given number of zones, and in section 7 how commuting costs affect the number 
of zones in the global optimum. 
5.1   Laissez Faire 
The laissez-faire allocation corresponds to the equilibrium with no government intervention. 
This allocation is inefficient and is the only allocation considered in the paper that is not related 
to a local optimum.  Under this allocation each atomistic firm, taking pollution concentrations 
as given, locates right next to its workers, reasoning that by doing so it eliminates their 
community costs and hence can pay them a lower wage. Thus, there is no commuting and the 
                                                 
9 Polinksy [16] provides a non-spatial example where Pigouvian taxes fail to achieve efficiency.  In his analysis of 
strict liability and negligence, Polinsky utilizes a partial equilibrium model almost identical in its mathematical 
exposition to that of Spulber’s model, with one small difference.  In Polinsky’s model, ‘care’ (the equivalent of 
negative emissions in our and Spulber’s models) reduces external damages caused by the individual firm, i.e. the 
amount of care provided by a firm is an argument with a negative effect in a separate damage function of the 
individual firm, which transforms emissions of each firm into monetary terms.  These individual money damages 
are then accumulated to obtain the total social damages.  In Spulber’s model, the emissions of the individual firms 
are added first and the accumulated amount of emissions is then converted to monetary terms via a single social 
damage function.  Both models are correctly specified and the differences in their specifications follow from 
differences in the issues examined.  These differences lead to what appear to be contradictory results of the two 
models; while in Spulber’s model Pigouvian taxes provide long-run efficiency, in Polinsky’s model they do not.  In 
Polinsky’s model, the separate damage functions introduce the non-linearity which in our model is introduced via 
the dispersion function. 
10 Proofs and technical elaboration of some cases appear in Appendices B and C, available on the internet.    20 
marginal productivity of emissions is zero. Firms collectively fail to take into account that the 
added emissions resulting from their location choices lead to wage increases that are needed to 
compensate for added pollution damages. Such allocations can be found in practice only in rural 
villages since agriculture is one of the few industries with technology close to constant returns 
to scale.   
5.2  Preliminaries to the Special Cases 
There are two relevant principal solution types11. One is an interior solution in which land 
use is mixed; i.e., a(x)> 0, b(x)> 0 and a(x)+b(x)=1 for all x.  Any such mixed allocation 
satisfying the necessary conditions of the previous section is a local optimum.12  In this case the 
two bid-rent functions RI() and Rh() coincide everywhere.  All other possible locally optimal 
allocations are corner solutions and involve separation of industrial and residential land.    
  Definition 3: A separated allocation is an optimal allocation in which industrial and 
residential land use are strictly separated.  Thus there are industrial zones and residential 
zones.  An empty area with no land use is also allowed; such an area is termed a buffer zone  
In each separated allocation, industrial and residential zones alternate, perhaps separated by 
buffer zones.13  A buffer zone exists between an industrial and a residential zone if there is a 
                                                 
11 The globally optimal land allocation may be an “empty” city, i.e., no households and no industry.  This outcome 
will occur if in all local optimum solutions the maximized surplus is negative. Namely, the price of the city’s 
export product is insufficient to maintain the predetermined utility level of the city residents. In the following 
analysis, only non-empty allocations, i.e.,  , 0 , 0  > S N  which satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions are 
considered. 
12 Note that often in problems involving inequalities only one type of extremum can result.  Here only local 
maxima can occur.  To see this, note that a solution with a positive S cannot be a local minimum since ax () and 
bx () can be reduced continuously while maintaining their ratio intact and thus reducing S until it disappears. Since 
we can increase density and commuting distances indefinitely, we can always increase a deficit (-S) indefinitely 
too. 
13 In the types of land use patterns analyzed in the paper, all land at a particular location is either vacant or 
occupied.  Zones with partially occupied and partially empty locations are also a possibility, however.  Housing in 
a partially empty location cannot arise, since positive marginal utility of housing implies that households in a 
particular location will use all or none of the available land at that location. In the case of industry, when  D 22 = 0  
the linear homogeneous production functions together with diminishing marginal productivity imply that there is 
no empty space where industry is located, since by keeping constant overall emissions, (a(x)e(x)),  as well as 
overall labor, (a(x)n(x)) , and expanding industry across the entire space in that location x (i.e. a(x)=1) output can    21 
segment of land between the two zones in which the two bid rents are negative. This may occur 
if, at these locations, concentration levels are too high and wages too low to support the 
predetermined economy-wide household utility level and if for the specified emission taxes and 
wages the industry suffers losses. There cannot be allocations with buffer zones between two 
residential zones or between two industrial zones.  
In practice, separation into industrial and residential zones is also the result of scale 
economies in production and in the consumption of collective goods. However, buffer zones are 
unique to pollution. Note that in practice buffer zones are often green areas since plants, 
especially trees, help reduce pollution. Moreover, large highways and freeways in the vicinity of 
densely populated areas (e.g., city bypasses), are also stationary sources of noise and air 
pollution.  Indeed, along many of these roads we observe green buffer zones near densely 
populated areas (e.g., Washington, D.C., Portland, Oregon).  In still other cities buffer zones 
often exist between waste collection industries (landfills) and households (e.g., Dallas, Texas).14 
Definition 4: A no-crossing location (NC location) is a location in either an industrial or a 
residential zone not crossed by commuters.15  
Lemma 2: The value of the function T() at a NC location is zero. 
Lemma. 3: In each residential and each industrial zone there is one and only one NC location 
(which may sometimes be extended to a NC area). 
                                                                                                                                                          
be increased without changing inputs. Furthermore, when D 22 >0, the reduction in emissions density also leads to a 
reduction in the contribution to concentrations, which in turn strengthens the tendency to fill in empty space or 
leave it entirely empty. However, when D 22 <0, reducing the density of emissions while keeping their total at the 
given location constant increases concentrations.  Consequently, we cannot rule out the possibility that increases in 
the concentrations will outweigh the effect of diminishing returns in production and result in an optimal solution 
with industrial zones which are only partially occupied.  In the subsequent analysis we shall disregard this case. 
14 For permanent versus temporary diminution in bid-rent schedules for households located near landfills, see 
McCluskey and Rausser [13,14]. 
15The NC locations are theoretical tools intended to help us in the coming analysis. In practice, because of 
irreversible investments, historical trends, social connections and the fact that there is more than one worker per 
household, such locations are unobserved.    22 
Proof:  Since paths of commuters cannot cross, in a residential zone there must be a location 
where all those living clockwise of this location commute clockwise and all those living 
counterclockwise of this location commute counterclockwise. In an industrial zone there must 
be a location at which commuters employed clockwise of that location commute 
counterclockwise and vice versa.  Each of these NC points can extend to an empty segment.  
Two or more NC locations with only residential and no industrial space between them cannot 
exist, since occupants between such locations would have to cross one of the NC points when 
commuting. Similarly, two NC points with only industrial and no residential space between 
them cannot exist.       
 Definition 5: An autonomous area (AA) is the area between two consecutive NC points.  
An autonomous area includes part of a residential zone and part of an industrial zone, and all 
households who reside in an AA also work there and vice versa.  If the allocation includes 
buffer zones, each AA includes an empty buffer zone between its residential and industrial 
zones.  The concept of an autonomous area is essentially based on NC points and as a result 
exists in theory only.  
 Without loss of generality, in what follows the origin will be placed at an NC point where 
residents are located.    23 
 
 
With these definitions, we can now relate the bid-rent functions to the qualitative spatial 
structure.  Let x0  andx1 be two consecutive NC points, the former in a residential zone and the 
latter in an industrial zone.  Fig. 2(a) depicts a separated allocation without buffer zones, with x  
being the boundary between the residential and the industrial zones at which the two bid-rent 
functions intersect.  Industry occupies locations where RI > Rh, residences occupy locations 
where Rh > RI, and rents must be non-negative where RI = Rh.  In Fig. 2(b) the bid-rent 
functions result in a buffer zone.  Both bid rents are zero at the boundaries of the buffer zone 
x and x  and remain non-positive everywhere over the zone. In Fig. 2(c) the two bid rents are 
constant and coincide everywhere over the autonomous area; industry and housing coexist 
everywhere, each at its own constant density. In this case all points are NC-points.    24 
 Assumption 1 (Symmetric Dispersion Assumption): D
+(e,y) = D
(e,y) D(e,y) for all e>0 and 
y>0. 
Henceforth we shall restrict our analysis to a more specific case in which dispersion is 
symmetric. The assumption is that pollution spreads clockwise and counterclockwise in the 
same way. This may happen in practice with respect to air pollution if throughout the year the 
wind blows in each direction with equal probability. The model can be solved under other 
assumptions (e.g.,D
+()= 0 and D
()> 0), but the solution under each assumption is different 
and space limitations dictate that we present only the symmetric case. 
5.3 Special Cases 
From the above definitions, the global optimum for three special cases can be characterized, 
each with one parameter having an extreme value (zero or infinity).  These special cases capture 
the essence of the solution in general and indicate the range of possible outcomes. 
5.3.1.  Case Zero:  Zero commuting cost 
In this case all parameters are presumed to be finite and strictly positive except t, commuting 
cost per unit distance, which is assumed to be zero. Zero commuting costs imply the same 
constant shadow wage,  () x  , everywhere.  As in the general case, pollution causes positive 
damages that increase with concentrations at any level of consumption, i.e., 




0(x) specify respectively the rent function, the industrial bid-rent function and the residential 
bid-rent function.  
Since pollution decays with distance, the greater the distance between polluter and pollutee, 
the lower the concentrations experienced by the pollutee, which leads to a higher utility level 
for a given level of the composite good and housing.  Since commuting costs are zero, this 
separation does not involve any loss of resources.  Under these conditions, separate industrial    25 
and residential zones arise.  Hence, a
0(x)b
0(x) = 0 for all x.  Moreover, there is only one 
industrial zone and one residential zone, and there may or may not be buffer zones between 
these zones.  Increasing the distance between polluter and pollutee reduces concentrations and 
therefore generates benefits without increasing costs.  Any solution with many industrial zones 
can be restructured as a single industrial zone without decreasing the distance between any 
residential and any industrial location and with some distances increasing.  An analogous 
argument holds for many residential zones. 
 If there is empty space in the midst of one of the occupied zones, land uses can be moved 
from the boundaries of the zone to fill it. Such reallocations increase the distances between the 
two land uses and thus reduce effective concentrations without entailing any cost.  As a result, 
an allocation with empty space in the midst of an occupied zone cannot be optimal. Therefore 
for all x in an occupied area (a residential or industrial zone),  a
0(x) + b
0(x) =1.  This condition 
together with a
0(x)b
0(x) = 0 implies that if one of these two variables is positive, its value 















Two NC points emerge, one, the origin 0, in the residential zone, and the other 0', in the 
industrial zone. T(x) is zero at both NC points.  Fig. 3 depicts the layout of the city ring with the 
boundaries of the different zones designated by xi
0, 0  xi
0  L, i = 0,1,2,3. 
0
0 x  is the southern 
boundary of the residential zone and the northern boundary of the southern buffer zone and 
0
2 x  









3 x x = .  The symmetric dispersion assumption (D
+() = D
()) implies that the allocation 
has OO' as an axis of symmetry. 
The bid-rent functions are equivalent to the residual income per unit land in each location 
(eqs. (16) and (17)). The density of land use is an increasing function of the rent.  When t=0, 
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Southern AA    27 
the rent together with the density of land use peak at the center of each zone.  The centers of 
each zone are also the NC points and the boundaries between the AAs.  In the industrial zone, 
since the center is the pollution-generating location furthest from all residential locations, the 
optimal tax Q is at its lowest level, andRI at its maximum there; analogously, since the center 
of the residential zone is least affected by pollution,  h R  is at its maximum there.  The lowest 
rents and densities are at the boundaries.  Also, rents rise monotonically within an occupied 
zone from the boundary to the center.  In a buffer zone and its boundaries, rents vanish, as does 
all economic activity. Small mining towns are an example of such a complete separation. 
Commuting costs are not zero but are negligible compared to pollution damages. 
5.3.2.  Case One: Pollution has no ill effects 
This case presumes Uc = 0 and 0 < t < ; namely pollution has no ill effects and commuting 
costs are positive.  We designate the solution of this case by superscript 1.  Since pollution 
causes no damage, the optimum entails zero commuting costs –– each household lives and 
works at the same location.  Since conditions are the same everywhere, symmetry implies that 
a
1(x) = a > 0, b
1(x) = b > 0 and a + b = 1 for all x. As a result, the land rent and wage rate are 
spatially constant.  Rural villages are an example of this case. Villages are also an example of a 
laissez faire allocation, however, here the allocation is optimal.  
5.3.3. Case Two: Mixed allocation 
In this case, pollution causes ill effects, i.e. for all positive arguments< Uc(h,z,c) < 0, 
and t is positive and finite. As in the previous case, laborers reside next to their workplace and 
all variables are spatially constant. The allocation is not a separated allocation and thus 
concentrations are affected only through the production process.  The solution for this case, 
distinguished by the superscript 2, is a local optimum for all t and a global optimum when t is 
sufficiently large.    28 
6. Local Optima16 
In general, local optima can be either mixed allocations (e.g., Case Two) or separated 
allocations. Case Two allocations are interior solutions since the variables a(x) and b(x), along  
with all other variables, obtain values in the interior of their domain of definition, while in the 
separated allocations a(x) and b(x) obtain boundary values and are therefore corner solutions. 
For a given set of parameter values, there might be several local optima that are corner 
solutions, each with a different number of autonomous areas. Even for a given number of AAs, 
there may also be more than one local optimum. 
In this section we characterize a general separated allocation and its supporting price system, 
by investigating the changes due to an increase in commuting costs in a local optimal solution 
with two symmetric AAs, as depicted in Fig. 3.  Similar relationships exist when the number of  
AAs is larger. As a reminder, we repeat the definition of the LNE, this time formally. 
Definition 6:  Local net earnings (LNE) , w(x), equal, in the supporting equilibrium, wages net 
of commuting  costs for a household living at x.  At an industrial location wx ()  is the wage 
rate. At a location where there is no industry, wx () is the wage rate net of commuting costs to 
the workplace. 
Lemma 4: In an AA, w(x), is a linear function of x and the absolute value of its slope equals t, 
viz.  
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16 Proofs of the Lemmas and Propositions of this section not presented in the text appear in Appendix C in the 





2 x and x  are the  boundary points in special Case Zero of the industrial area in the 
northern and southern parts of the AA, respectively,  as depicted in Figure 3, and  ) ; (
0
2 t x   (also 
equal to ) ; (
0
3 t x  ), which we refer to as the intercept of w(x;t), is a function of t but not of x. 
In what follows, we deal only with the northern AA while keeping in mind that the 
southern AA is symmetric, with OO' as the axis of symmetry (see Fig. 3).  Lemma 4 
implies that if t is positive, the LNE in the industrial zone increases at the rate of t per unit 
distance when moving from the boundary of the industrial zone towards the NC point. 
The opposite occurs when moving away from the boundary into the residential or buffer 
zone. Lemma 4 is a standard result in models with separation into distinct industrial and 
residential zones.   
Corollary 3: An increase in t augments the multiplier of x in  ) ; ( t x  , and moves the intercept 
) ; (
0




 ) ; (
0
2 .  The shift factor can be positive, negative, or zero, 
depending on the model's details. 
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For ease of exposition, henceforth we restrict the analysis only to cases without buffer 
zones.  Notable differences arising from the presence of buffer zones will be commented 
on in footnotes.  Fig. 4 demonstrates the possible effects of an increase of t on  ) ; (
0
2 t x   in 
the northern AA.  The line    B    B ' depicts  ) ; ( t x   with t>0,  ' C C   depicts  () 0 ; x  , and  ˜  x  
denotes the location where    B    B ' and  ' C C    intersect. Since the local net earnings (LNE) 
function pivots around  ˜  x , we refer to  ˜  x  as the pivot point. There are two cases which 
differ according to whether  ˜  x  lies to the left or right of x2
0— the boundary between the 
residential and the industrial zone with t=0.  When  ˜  x  lies to the left of x2
0,  then the shift 
factor is positive and the wage rate increases in the AA throughout the industrial zone, 
while the local net earnings (LNE) in the residential zone increases near the boundary and 
decreases near the no crossing  (NC) point 0.  When  ˜  x  lies to the right ofx2
0  — the shift    31 
factor is negative — the LNE decreases throughout the residential zone while the wage 
rate in the industrial zone falls near the boundary and increases near the NC point L 2. 
The total derivative of the functions  I h k Rk , , =  with respect to t is given by 

















, where i are the controls and shadow prices of the system. 
Lemma 5.  In the optimum allocation, both bid rents are functions of x and of t, and 
 i.    In the residential zone 
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Lemma 5 demonstrates that commuting costs affect the bid-rent functions only through 
) ; ( t x  ; the terms for the other controls disappear.  The change in the industrial bid rent at a 
given location is negatively related to the change in the wage rate, with the factor of 
proportionality  ) (x n , the local labor density.  The change in the residential bid rent at a given 
location is proportional to the change of the LNE, with the factor of proportionality  () x h
1
, the 








, i.e. at the 
pivot point, the bid rent functions remain unchanged as well.  Commuting costs cause both bid-
rent functions to pivot around  ˜  x . 





How does the optimal autonomous area (AA) change as t changes?  We have investigated 
above how a change in t alters the bid-rent functions.  What we need to determine, therefore, is 
how the optimal AA changes as the bid-rent functions change.  Two patterns emerge, which are 
distinguished according to whether the shift factor is positive (pattern I) or negative (pattern II).  
Parts (a), (b), and (c) of Figure 5 address pattern I, part (d) pattern II.  As above,  ˜  x  indicates the 


















  In Fig. 5(a),  ) (
0 x Rh , the residential bid-rent function in case zero, t = 0, is depicted by the 
downward-sloping line    C C   C .  In Fig. 5(b) the industrial bid-rent function in case zero, RI
0(x), 
is depicted by the upward-sloping line      C C     C  , and intersects    C C   C  at x2
0 when both bid rents 
are positive. 
The patterns are as follows: 
Pattern I (a positive shift factor) emerges when t increases from zero to t  >0 and the 
pivot pointx % is left of the boundary point x2
0  (see Fig. 4).    34 
 In this pattern the increase in t causes the residential bid rent to increase near the boundary 
(x2
0 ) and decrease near the origin; in Fig. 5(a), the line AAA represents Rh(x,t ), and 
C´CC´,Rh
0(x,0).  In this pattern the increase in t causes the industrial bid rent to fall 
everywhere in the industrial zone, less so near the boundary (x2
0 ) and more so near L/2; the line 
A"AA" in Fig. 5(b) represents RI (x,t), and      C C     C  , RI
0(x,0).  The rent functions before and 
after the shift, depicted in Fig. 5(c), are the upper envelope curves of the before and after bid-
rent functions.  The boundary moves right from x2
0  to 
A x2 .  
The increase in t causes the residential zone to expand and the industrial zone to shrink by 
the same amount.  In the industrial zone, the rent declines everywhere, less near the boundary 
(x2
0 ) and more near L/2.  In the residential zone, the rent function increases near the boundary 
(x2
0 ) and decreases near the origin.  
Pattern II (a negative shift factor) emerges when t increases from zero to t > 0 and the 
pivot point  ˜  x  is right of the boundary point x2
0 .  
 With this pattern, the increase in t causes the residential bid-rent function to decline 
throughout the residential zone, more near the origin than close to the boundary; in Fig. 5(d), 
the line    B B represents Rh(x,t) whereRh(x,t)  RI (x,t), and    C C represents Rh(x,t) where 
Rh
0(x,0) RI
0(x,0).  The industrial bid-rent function increases near the boundary of the 
industrial zone and decreases near the origin.  In Fig. 5(d), B     B   represents RI (x,t), where 
RI (x,t)  Rh(x,t), and C     C   represents RI
0(x,0), where RI
0(x,0) Rh
0(x,0).  The boundary 
point between the two zones moves left from x2
0  to 
A x2  so that the industrial zone expands and 
the residential zone shrinks.  The rent falls everywhere except near the boundary of the 
industrial zone.     35 
In both patterns, the density of population in the residential zone and the density of 
employment in the industrial zone move in the same direction as the corresponding rents, while 
the total AA's population declines.  Which of these patterns occurs depends on the production 
and pollution dispersion technologies, as well as tastes.17  
Since the commuting and pollution effects influence the industrial bid rent function in the 
same direction, it always decreases with distance from the NC point at a decreasing rate. 
However, the commuting and pollution effects influencing the residential bid rent, unlike the 
case of the industrial bid rent, run in opposite directions and thus the residential bid rent may 
either decrease or increase with distance. Nevertheless, at the boundary the slope of the 
residential bid rent in the direction away from the boundary is always higher than the slope of 
the industrial bid rent. Note that when commuting costs are low compared to pollution damages 
(e.g., case zero) the slope of the residential bid rent when moving away from the boundary is 
increasing. Conversely, in the direction of the industrial zone the industrial bid rent's slope is 
increasing and higher than that of the residential zone. Otherwise, housing will outbid the 
industry in the industrial zone and industry outbid housing in the residential zone, which is 
impossible. In general, close to the residential NC point the residential bid rent may become 
convex, decline, or even become negative.  However, this outcome cannot occur in the global 
optimum, since a solution with a larger number of smaller zones is then more efficient.  With 
zero commuting costs (case zero), the rent function is at a local maximum at the NC points, 
gradually declining towards the boundary where it reaches its lowest level. 
                                                 
17 The above analysis can be modified straightforwardly to cover the situation when there is a buffer zone in the 
AA. The results are broadly similar. In a buffer zone case, however, an increase in t may cause both occupied 
zones to shrink and the buffer zone to expand. This will occur whenever   (x,t +t) intersects  (x,t) in  the 
buffer zone. The intuition is that with an expanding buffer zone, both commuting distances and emissions increase 
with offsetting effects on pollution concentrations, while employment density decreases and wages increase. 
Indeed, within the residential zone the LNE and the rent may be lower but pollution concentrations can fall due to 
the increased distance.    36 
Lemma 6: When t increases, the absolute value of the slope of the rent function falls except 
perhaps near the boundary, where it may increase. 
Lemma 6 states that an increase in t causes the rent function (see Fig. 5) to become flatter 
everywhere except perhaps for pattern I over 
0
22 ,
A xx    and for pattern II over 
0
22 [,]
A xx.  
The above analysis pertains only to the case of two AAs.  Symmetry dictates through 
Lemma 7 that the analysis can apply with no significant changes to any even number of AAs. 
 Lemma 7: For each t>0, there may exist a local optimum solution with 2m zones, where m 
can be a subset of (or all) the integers fulfilling    1 m. If 2m is the fixed number of AAs in 
an allocation, so is the number of NC points which are located at the boundaries of the AAs 
(and in the middle of the occupied zones).  All AAs are of the same size with an area of L/2m 
and each AA is the mirror image of its neighbor AAs.  The qualitative results discussed 
previously in this section of the effects of an increase of t on the internal structure of an AA 
hold for the general case as well. 
We now summarize the role of the pivot point in the following corollary. 
Corollary 4: If the pivot point lies inside the industrial zone, the zone expands with t and the 
residential zone contracts. Both population and employment density decline, but since more 
land is allocated to industry than before and less to housing, employment density decreases 
proportionally more.   
If the pivot point lies inside the residential zone, the zone expands with t and the industrial 
zone contracts. Population density then declines proportionally more than employment density.  
Corollary 4 reveals that the location of the pivot point reflects where it is efficient to allocate 
more land when the density of population/employment changes. Obviously, the allocation of 
land and with it the location of the pivot point depends on whether land is more useful in 
production or in consumption.    37 
In addition to the symmetric solutions, there may be asymmetric solutions with AAs of 
varying sizes.  Disregarding problems of indivisibility, each of the AAs in an asymmetric 
solution will also appear in a symmetric solution of a different number of zones. Of any two 
such symmetric solutions one is superior to the other and therefore superior to the asymmetric 
solution. We will ignore the case where we are indifferent between the two solutions and their 
mixture.  Thus, there is always a symmetric global optimum.  
The parameter t does not always have a finite upper bound above which a separated local 
optimum does not exist (note that m =  is equivalent to case two, the solution of mixed land 
uses).  It might occur that as t grows larger, buffer zones disappear and the density of land use 
in the occupied areas becomes lower and more concentrated around the boundaries of the 
occupied zones.  A further increase in t may cause the centers of the occupied zones to become 
empty, thus changing the no-crossing points to no-crossing segments.  And when t approaches 
infinity, the actual occupied areas in the zones shrink towards the boundaries, approaching zero 
but never completely disappearing while t is finite.  An allocation with a no-crossing segment in 
the middle of the two occupied areas cannot be a global optimum, however, since a solution 
with a larger number of fully occupied smaller zones is clearly more efficient. As a result, as t 
approaches infinity, the global optimum always entails a mixed allocation.    
The following Proposition concerns the decentralization of a local optimum.  
Proposition 2:  To implement the allocation of a given local optimum solution, a developer (or 
local government) has only to choose an origin and impose on each unit of land the optimal 
corrective tax of the supporting market allocation corresponding to the local optimum.  Market 
competition will allow any local optimum to be supported as a competitive equilibrium.  
Proof:  In this section we have shown that in each decentralized local optimum both industry 
and housing have different bid rent functions defined over the entire city. We also showed that    38 
industry outbids residents in industrial zones, residents outbid industry in residential zones, and 
in buffer zones both the industry and the residents do not bid.  Since the bid rents reflect the 
maximum amount each sector is willing to pay under these conditions, the desired local 
optimum is the only outcome which can result from competition between industry and 
residents.  
7.  Global Optimum.18 
We have argued that a particular economy may have multiple local maxima, each 
corresponding to a qualitatively different spatial configuration.  We now develop results 
concerning the global maximum.  We define net surplus functions, each of which is indexed by 
the integer number of zone pairs and t.  Each of these surplus functions is declining in t, and the 
rate of decline is lower the larger the number of zone pairs.  Plotting these net surplus functions 
against t, their upper envelope indicates how the globally optimal spatial configuration varies 
with t. 
Initially, when t=0 , the global optimum consists of two AAs (case zero).  In this case, 
) 0 , ( 0 ) 0 , ( 1 2 x R x R h I & & > > .  It is possible that any increase in t, even an infinitesimal one, will 
cause the internal allocation to become the global optimum.  In this section, only cases in which 
separation is the global optimum for at least some positive t are investigated.  For simplicity, we 
assume that for a given t each positive integer m, where 2m is a given number of AAs in the 
solution, has no more than one local optimum19.  
Definition 9:  Let S
*(m,t) designate the maximized surplus of a local separated optimum 
solution with commuting cost t  0and 2m AAs, m being a positive integer.  
                                                 
18  Proofs of the Lemmas and Propositions of this section not presented in the text appear in Appendix C of the 
internet version of the paper. 
19 In general, there may exist more than one local optimum for a given number of zones. The assumption made 
here of a single local optimum for each m simplifies the exposition, but it is not difficult to extend the analysis to 
the more general case.    39 
In what follows we investigate the number of zones in the global optimum by finding the m 
that maximizes S
* for a given t. 
 Lemma 9: The following are properties of the function S
*(m,t): 
(i)   S
*(m,t) t =  T(x) 0
L
 dx  0 
(ii)  i j





> >    







 and for all t for which both functions are positive and well-defined 
(iii)  ()() 0 , 0 ,
* *
j i m S m S >   for all pairs fulfilling mj > mi. 
 
 
Lemma 9 reveals (see Fig. 6) that: (i) the slope of S
* m,t ()  in the (S,t) plane is non-positive 
and strictly negative as long as m is finite (since |T(x)|  in a separated solution is positive almost    40 
everywhere); (ii)  in the (S,t) plane at a given t, S
*(m,t) is steeper for smaller m (because  |T(x)| 
attains higher values in larger zones); and (iii)  the intercept on the S axis of S
* m,t ()  in the (S, t) 
plane is decreasing with m (since pollution damages increase and therefore the value of  
S
*(m,0) decreases with the number of zones –– see case zero for the proof) . 
The corollary below now follows directly from Lemma 9: 
Corollary 5 In the (S,t) plane, two S
* m,t ()  curves with different m's may intersect in the 
positive orthant at most once (see Fig. 6). 
The above corollary follows directly from (ii) in Lemma 9, which implies that the smaller is m, 
the steeper is S
* for a given t.   
Lemma 10: For a given t, the global optimum allocation is the local optimum allocation for 
which m




* t ()  may be infinite for all t). 
The lemma above follows from the definition of S
* and the nature of the global optimum for 
a given t.  
Definition 10: Let  ˆ  S 
*(t) = S
*(m
*(t), t) be the global optimum value of the surplus as a function 
of t.  
Lemma 10 implies that  ˆ  S 
* t ()  is the upper envelope curve of all the S
*(m,t) in the (S,t) plane.  
Lemma 9, Corollary 5 and Lemma 10 provide the basis for Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3:  Let 2m
* t () be the number of AAs in the global optimum solution of the problem 
with commuting costs t. The function m
* t () , defined in Lemma 10, is a non-decreasing step 
function of t,  0  t . 
The proof of Proposition 3 is straightforward.  Lemma 9 and Corollary 5 imply that two 
S
*(m,t) curves intersect only once in the  S,t ()  plane, and the one with lower m intersects the    41 
other from above. Thus, if mi < mj and both are in the global solution, mi will be associated 
with lower t than mj. 








m(t j).  
Let i index the order of m in the global optimum,  I i ,..., 1 = . 20 
Corollary 7:  For  () I i , ... , 1  , the set of all t’s for which mi = m
*(t) is a connected segment of 
the non-negative t axis.  The intersection of each consecutive pair of segments is a single point 
and the union of allI segments of t’s exhausts the half line t  0.  Finally, with i > j , if 
m
*   t  () = mi and m
*     t  () = mj, then    t  >     t  . 
Corollary 7 indicates that the number of zone pairs  m ()  at the global optimum is a non-
decreasing function of commuting costs.  I, the number of m’s in the global optimum for some 
subset of t, can be any positive integer or infinity. 
To complete the characterization of the global solution, the concept of a commuting cost 
threshold is introduced.    
Definition 11: Define t(m i), i =1,2,...,I , to be the commuting cost threshold of an allocation 
with 2mi AAs. t(mi) is the lowest commuting cost in which 2mi zones are the number of AAs in 
the global optimum, i.e.,  } ) ( *   min{ ( ) i i m t m t m t = = .  
                                                 
20 For example, with I=10, and () 10 1 ,...,m m =(1,4,6,9,11,14,15,19,23,25), in the global optimum for t=0 there are 
two AAs and the global optimum for infinite  t  has 50 AAs.    42 
 
In Fig. 7,    t(m i), i =1,2,...,I are the jump points of the step function m*(t), and in Fig. 6 
they are the values of  t at the intersection points of the S
* curves in the global optimum.  Note 
that () I m m , ... , 1  is a set of increasing, not necessarily consecutive, positive integers whose 
number I may or may not be infinite.21 
Proposition 4:  The Threshold Theorem. 
(i) When t increases and reaches t(mi), the number of zones in the global optimal allocation 
increases from mi1 to mi and remains at this level until t reaches t mi+1 () . 
(ii) mI =  always, even when I is finite and t() . 
(iii) m1 =1 and t(1) = 0.  
                                                 
21 In the paper we assume full divisibility of all variables, as is often done in urban economics and other branches 
of economics. The number of zones is an exception because it must be an integer variable. However, the zone's size 
still satisfies this assumption. In practice, when residential zones become too small to contain even a single 
household, the optimum is either the solution with a smaller number of zones, each with a single household, or the 
mixed solution which is also a local optimum, whichever is more efficient.    43 
Proof: Part (i) follows from the definition of t()as the lower bound of all t’s having the 
same number of zones in the global optimum, and mi > mi1 by construction; (ii) follows from 
the fact that the mixed solution, which is equivalent to a solution with an infinite number of 
zones, is always the solution when t becomes sufficiently large to deter commuting, so the value 
of S
*(,t) is independent of t; and (iii) follows from the fact that case zero is always the 
solution when t = 0. 
The following proposition concerns implementation of optimal corrective taxes, this time in 
the global optimum. 
Proposition 5: To achieve global efficiency, including the optimal zoning allocation, a 
developer (or a local government) has only to levy at every location x the  corrective tax per 
unit of land of the global optimum solution . The global optimal corrective tax is the corrective 
tax Q(x) for the particular local optimum solution that is the global optimum for the given t.
22
 
The proof follows directly from Proposition 2. 
  
8.  Concluding Remarks. 
This paper characterized the social optimum in a spatial economy with pollution, and its 
decentralization.  Its main innovation over previous literature is that land use is completely 
endogenous.  The model is of a ring-shaped economy with residential and industrial land use.  
Employing a constant-returns-to-scale technology, firms use land and labor to produce a 
composite good, with emissions as an undesirable by-product.  Households supply fixed labor 
to firms, to which they commute, derive utility from housing and the composite good, and 
                                                 
22 Note that the optimal corrective taxes are very complicated to compute, especially since taxes vary from one 
location to another. Regulations on emissions, as suggested in Hochman and Ofek [9] may prove more practical to 
implement.     44 
suffer disutility from the concentration of pollution at their place of residence.  The optimal land 
use pattern is then determined by the tradeoff between pollution and commuting costs.   
At one extreme, when transport costs are high, firms and households are completely 
intermixed; commuting costs are eliminated but pollution concentration at residential locations 
is high.  At the other extreme, when pollution is highly noxious, households crowd together at 
one end of the ring and firms at the other end, with buffer zones in between; commuting costs 
are high but pollution concentrations at residential locations low.  Between these two extremes 
is a wide range of possibly optimal land use patterns — different numbers of pairs of residential 
and industrial zones, perhaps with buffer zones. 
Our specification of the mapping from the spatial distribution of pollution emissions to the 
spatial distribution of pollution concentrations is more general than previous specifications in 
the literature, though still not completely general.  Under our specification, the global optimum 
can be decentralized with a spatially differentiated tax per unit of industrial land set equal to the 
additional damages caused by the total emissions from the unit of land, evaluated at the social 
optimum.  A spatially differentiated Pigouvian tax — a tax on emissions — will not 
decentralize the optimum. 
To focus on essentials, our model contained only two forces whose interaction determines 
the pattern of land use.  Commuting costs are an attractive force between residences and firms, 
pollution a repulsive force. As well, we considered an ex ante homogenous space to abstract 
from edge effects/spatial inhomogeneities. However, our model could be enriched to 
incorporate other forces affecting optimal land use, such as the scale-economies-agglomeration 
(SEA) treated in Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg [11]23.  
                                                 
23 First, consider the laissez-faire allocation when the scale-economies-agglomeration à la Rossi-Hansberg are 
introduced into a ring-shaped city without pollution.  When transport costs are zero, there will be one industrial and 
one residential area, with two NC points, one located at the midpoint of each area.  The two boundaries between    45 
Future research should investigate how pollution from stationary sources interacts with the 
other forces which have been identified in the literature as affecting the pattern of land use: 
returns to scale in production, spatial inhomogeneity, linkages, product variety, spatial 
interaction, traffic congestion, and automobile pollution.  A natural extension for further 
research is to allow population groups to differ in skills, wages and thus utility levels with 
distances from polluting firms related to household income levels.
                                                                                                                                                          
these two areas are straight lines, and the industrial and residential areas are completely separated. The rent 
function in the industrial zone has a maximum at the NC point in the middle of the zone and monotonically 
declines as a decreasing rate when moving towards the boundary.  At the boundary, the rent function is kinked and 
becomes constant throughout the residential area.  The density of employees follows the industrial bid-rent 
function, having its maximum in the center and declining towards the boundary.  The density of households is 
constant in the residential area.   
  When commuting costs (in Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, they are of the iceberg type) increase, the whole 
rent function shifts down and in the residential area slopes downward from the boundary to the NC point.  With 
further increases in commuting costs, the boundary line becomes a boundary zone within which industry and 
households are mixed.  As commuting costs are further increased, at some point, the two areas will split into four, 
and so on.   
  Now augment the model with two areas so that factories pollute.  The rent function and the density will 
decline in the two areas, especially near the boundary zone, which shrinks and becomes a boundary line once 
again.  The rent function in the residential area becomes flatter. As pollution becomes increasingly severe, rent and 
density decline even more near the boundary line and may disappear, with a buffer zone appearing.  The rent 
function in the residential zone near the boundary line may increase before it starts declining again.  When optimal 
pollution taxes are levied, rents and density increase and the buffer zones shrink or disappear.   
     46 
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Appendix A (for Publication) 
Derivation of the First-Order (Kuhn-Tucker) Conditions for a Local Optimum 
Let L be the Lagrangean of the model, where the variables, constraints and shadow prices are as 
defined in sections 2 – 4 of the paper. 
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It should be noted that(x), the shadow price of the commuting constraint, is different from 
() x  , the co-state of T(x) as defined in the text.  We elaborate below on the relation between 
the two. The necessary conditions are as follows.24, 25 
 = +
L
x dy y x f x a x n A 0 ] ) ( ) ( )[ (          ) (        ) 2   ( 1   
(A 3) 
x 2
21 1 L x- 2
( )         ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( ( ), )  - ( ) ( ( ),  ) ] 0
L x
x ex ax f x yD ex y xd y yD ex x yd y
+ +      = 
  
                                                 
24 The variable of differentiation is noted on the left-hand side of each equation.  Note that a function with a 
number as a subscript indicates derivations of the function with respect to the variable of the order of the subscript. 
25 With a slight abuse of notation,  fx ()  fnx () ,ex () () ,etc.    48 
(A 4)  +   
+ + 2 ) , ) ( ( ) ( [ ) (          ) (
L x




+ ( ) ( ( ), ) ] ( ) ( ) ( )+ (x)=0
L
L xx yD exx yd y nx yd y x

  +      
(A 5)  h(x)  ()  = + +
L
x h dy y
x h
x b
x U x x z
x h
x b
0   ) (
) (
) (
) ( ) (
) (
) (
2 2    










(A 7)  zx ()   
bx ()
hx ()
+  x () Uz x () = 0 
 Since  () () () [] () x T x T sign x T = , differentiation of  L  with respect to Tx ()  yields:26  
(A 8)  T(x)  [( ) ] ( ) 0 signT x t x  + =  
(A 9)  c(x)  (x)Uc(x)+(x)= 0 
  Define the co-state of T(x) to be  ) (x  : 
   
L
x dy y x A     ) ( ) (          ) 10   (   
Then 
(  10 )       (x)= (x) [ ( )] . A signT x t   = &  
                                                 
26 Sign(c) is differentiable and its derivative equals zero everywhere except at x = 0 where the derivative is not 
defined. The function sign enables differentiation of  Tx ()  everywhere except at x = 0. 
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   Substituting out (x) from the above equations using (A 10), and then eliminating  x ()  
from the equations by substituting from (A 9), we obtain the necessary conditions as specified in 
the text. 
    50 
Appendix B (not for publication) 
Proofs and Derivations 
Proof of Lemma 1:  
Consider the boundary points of the zones in an optimal allocation, e.g.x1 and x2 , x1 < x2 , as 
depicted in Fig.3 of the paper. The bid-rent rule implies that at such boundary points the slopes 
with respect to distance (designated by a dot over the function) of the bid-rent functions must 
fulfill  ) ( ) ( 1 2 x R x R h I & &  , otherwise the allocation is not optimal. Suppose, only for the sake of 
proving a contradiction, that    ) ( ) ( 1 2 x R x R h I & & < , then industry outbids housing in the residential 
zone and housing outbids industry in the industrial zone. Switch the location of a single 
household at x1and a firm occupying the same amount of land at x2 . Since industry outbids 
housing in the residential zone and vice versa in the industrial zone, this transfer increases total 
rents.  It also increases total pollution damages since it shortens distances between polluters and 




 = S), total rents and optimal taxes together constitute the goal function. 
Since the switch increases the goal function, the initial allocation is not optimal; a contradiction. 
Hence  ) ( ) ( 1 2 x R x R h I & & < / . 
Calculating the Spatial Derivatives of the Bid Rent Functions 
We differentiate the bid-rent functions with respect to distance x.  First we differentiate Eq. (17) at 
locations where a(x) > 0 and substitute (7), (8), (13), and (14b) into the result to yield: 
(B1)   []
dy y x x e D y dy x y x e D y
L x e D L x e D L x n t x T sign
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Use has also been made of the continuity assumption D
+(e,0) = D
(e,0)and 
(x + L 2) = (x  L 2) (because (x + L 2) and (x  L 2) are the same point.) 
By differentiating (1) with respect to x and substituting Rh x () =
Uh x ()
Uz x ()
 into the result, we get the 
expression  0 ) ( =  + = + + c h z h R c U U z h R h z c h & & & & & &  , where the second equality is obtained by 
substitution of (12) with b(x)=1 into the first equality. We then differentiate (17) and substitute 
Rh x () =
Uh x ()
Uz x ()
 into the result to obtain the first equality: 
(B2a)     [] )] (
) (
) (
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The second equality is obtained after substitution of (12) and (8) into the previous term.  
  Differentiating (2) with respect to x yields 
(B2b)    
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where once more we have made use of the facts that x + L 2 = x  L 2 and that  
D
+(e,0) = D
(e,0). Substituting (B2b) into (B2a) yields the desired expression for  h R & . 
Buffer Zones and Boundary Conditions In a Two AA’s Case 
  In Fig.3 of the paper the following chain of inequalities holds: 
 (B3)             0 < x1  x2 < x3  x0 < L 
where xi , i = 0,1,2,3 are the boundaries of the different zones. A necessary condition for optimal 
boundaries is RI(x2) = Rh(x1 ) and RI(x3) = Rh(x0).  If x1 = x2 and x3 = x0, buffer zones do not    52 
exist and there is only a residential zone and an industrial zone.  However, if in the optimum only 
strong inequalities hold between the boundaries specified in (B3), the solution also includes buffer 
zones. 
  A segment of the ring is a buffer zone if for all x of the segment,  () 0 , () 0 Ih Rx Rx  <   (by 
saying that Rh(x) < 0 we mean that if z(x)fulfills U(,z(x),c(x)) = u0, then 
) ( ) ( x z x   (=h(x)Rh(x))<0).  At the boundary of a buffer zone and an industrial zoneRI(x)= 0, 
and at the boundary of a residential zone and a buffer zoneRh(x) = 0. Additional necessary 
conditions for the general zoning case are: 
(B4)      
RI(x)< Rh(x)> 0 for x0  x  L; and 0  x  x1
0 < RI(x)> Rh(x)for x2  x  x3
 
and the following conditions are specific to buffer zones. 
(B5)      
Rh(x)  0, RI(x)  0 forx1  x  x2  and  x3  x  x0
Rh(x0) = Rh(x1) = RI(x2) = RI(x3) = 0 and
Rh(x2)  0, Rh(x3)  0 RI(x0)  0 RI(x1)  0
 
    Since we use the assumption D
+(e,y) = D
(e,y)(Assumption 1) and disregard problems 
of indivisibility and multiple optima, there is complete symmetry between north and south. That is 
OO’, the line through the origin and the second NC point, divides the circle into two halves and 
serves as an axis of symmetry between two mirror images.  Thus x0 + x1 = L = x2 + x3; see Fig. 3, 
which depicts a case where this assumption holds. 
Application of the Bid-Rent Rule to Case Zero: 
  Consider first the southern boundary of the residential zone, x0
0. It is either an intersection 
point of the two bid-rent curves and there is no buffer zone south of the residential zone, or    53 
Rh(x0
0) = 0,  RI(x0
0)< 0 and an empty buffer zone exists between the residential and industrial 
zones (see Fig. 3 ).  Since in case zero t=0, the first term in the RHS of (B2a) disappears. The 
second term there depends on  ()
0
0 x c & given in (B2b). The assumption D
+(e,y) = D
(e,y)=D(e,y)  
implies that the last term of  ()
0
0 x c &  is zero.  Upon substitution of  x=x0
0 and the above symmetry of 
the dispersion functions assumption into (B2b), we obtain  
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  There are four cases: 
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0 + L x0
0 > x3
0  x2
0  is that the residential area exceeds the industrial area and vice 
versa when the inequality is reversed. In all cases, the first term on the RHS of (B6) is negative 













x  and zero elsewhere, and since  [] 0 2 <  D . 
  In cases I and III, the second term on the RHS of (B6) does not exist since the boundaries of 
the integral are an empty set. Since  x0
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3 () > 0while in Case III, 
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  Now consider the other two cases. The second term of (B6) is derived from the contribution 
to concentrations at 
0




2 L x x +  of the industrial area. Mirror symmetry    54 




1 , 2 x L x +  contributes to 
0
1 x  the same amount of concentrations. 
Thus,  
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x dy y L x y e D y a dy x y y e D y a  
A shift of 
0
0 x  in the positive direction decreases the left-hand side of the above equality the same 
way a shift of 
0
1 x  in the negative direction effects the right-hand side. Thus, the second term on 
the right-hand side of (B6) can be written as   
   +
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0  designate the 
same point. The second inequality above follows the discussion above. 
The first term on the right-hand side of (B6) can be broken down as 




























 Subtracting  ST from FT yields 
When D22>0 the second integral in c &  above is negative as well as the first and therefore the whole 
expression. When D22<0, however, the second term is positive and therefore the sign of  ()
0
0 x c &  
may theoretically be positive. Note, however, that when D22<0, both D2(e,y) and D(e,y)  disappear 
for relatively small  y, so that the second term of the second  integral in  ()
0
0 x c &  above may be non 
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existent. If however, if the term does exist, ()
0
0 x c &  can never be positive since then  ()
0
0 x Rh &  is 
negative which means that the housing bid rent in the residential zone is negative and outside the 
residential zone it is positive—a contradiction. Therefore either  ()
0
0 x c &  is negative or the internal 
mixed solution holds.  




x RI .  By substituting t=0 and 
 + = D D  the first line in the RHS of  
(B1) disappears.   Equation (11) with b(x)=0  outside the residential zone implies 
(y) = 0, for x1
0 < y < x0
0.  Consequently, the integrals in the second line of (B1) reduce to the 




0  only.  There are two cases to consider. In the first, the industrial zone is 
larger than the residential zone; in the second, the opposite is true. When the industrial zone is 
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L x   (none of the pollution from x0
3 
that travels counter-clockwise reaches the residential zone). As a result  
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When the industrial zone is smaller than the residential zone, the second term of (B1) for 
0
3 x  is  
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    where the equality in the expression 
follows by mirror symmetry. Substituting the above into the remaining second line of (B1) yields 
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When D22<0 the second term in the first integral, as before may be non existent. If, however, the 
first integral is positive,  ()
0
3 x RI &  cannot be non-negative because then the industrial bid rent is 
negative in the industrial zone and positive outside the zone. In that case a zoning solution is 
impossible and the internal mixed solution holds.     56 
 Since    x0
0 and x3
0 are boundary points they are also points of intersection of bid-rent 
curves and as such satisfy the bid-rent rule. Our results imply that north of x0
0 residents outbid 
industry and south of x3




0 x x = , and   








0  = = = x x r x R x R I h . The rent function at this boundary is not differentiable and has a 
positive derivative in the positive direction of the x-axis and a negative derivative from the 






3 x R x R x r h I > = = . 
   In complete mirror symmetry to the case of x0
0 and x3
0, we can obtain expressions for the 
slopes of the bid rent functions in x1
0and x2
0. The results imply that south of 
0
1 x  residents outbid 
industry and north  of 
0




1 x x = , and   








1  = = = x x r x R x R I h . The rent function at this boundary is not differentiable and has a 
positive derivative in the negative direction of the x-axis and a negative derivative in the positive 






2 x R x R x r h I > = =     57 
 
 
Appendix C (not for publication) 
Further Proofs 
Proof of Lemma 4 
The commuting cost parameter t appears in the necessary conditions explicitly only in the 
expression of  &(Eq. (8)).  We already established that choosing the NC point of the residential 
zone as the origin makes T(x) positive clockwise of the origin up to the second NC point at L/2, 
from which point on sign(T(x)) is negative up to x=L.  Substituting +1 and   -1 for sign(T(x)) in 










L x L for t




) (  &   which upon integration 
yields (21).  From (7) we know that (x) in the industrial zone is equal to the wage at x and 
from (11), the budget constraint, that in the residential zone, (x)is the LNE –– household 
earned income after commuting costs have been deducted.  From (21) it is clear that the highest 
wage is at  x=L/2 (O in Fig. 3).  In the residential zone,(x) is independent of work location 
and depends only on place of residence.  
Proof of Corollary 3 
  Differentiating (21) with respect to t  yields 
(C1)     () 2 0 ,
) ; ( ) (
2











where x2  is the boundary of the industrial zone and the term   t t x  / ) ; ( 2   represents the change 
in the wage rate there when t changes.  t t x  / ) ; ( 2   is essentially a shift parameter since it is 
independent of location.        58 
Proof of Lemma 5 
   The generalized Henry George rule (see Arnott [2]) implies that the net city surplus 






  (see also Hochman and Ofek [9]) where r(x)  equals Rh(x) in 









dx x Q dx x r
0 0 ) ( ) (
 
 where  i is any control variable or shadow price, except for a(x) 
and b(x) whose derivatives are everywhere zero except at the boundary points where they are 
discontinuous.  Of these variables only (y) and e(x)  appear in Q(x).  Since in the residential 
zone where Q(x) is zero, r(x) = Rh(x)  we have Rh(x) i(x) =  Q(x) i(x)=0, and in the 
industrial zone where r(x) = RI(x), the non- zero differentials are 
RI(x) (y) =  Q(x) (y)and RI(x) e(x) =  Q(x) e(x) .  However we observe in (12) 
that (y) is independent of t,  and from the rest of the production equations so is e(x) (actually 
() x   is the only variable which depends on t and it does not appear in Q). From (14b) Q is also 
directly independent of t, hence t Q   =0.  Consequently by differentiating (16) with respect to t  
we get  
(C 2)    . ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t x x n t x R dt x dR I I       = =  
Similarly, by differentiating (17) we obtain  
(C 3)    () () . ) ) ( (
1
) ( ) ( t x
x h
t x R dt x dR h h      = =  
 
Proof of Lemma 6  
 Differentiating (C 2) with respect to x yields       59 
And differentiating (C 3) gives 
(C 5)              
() () () ()
() () ()
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  We are still looking at the northern hemisphere in the two AA’s case. Consider the RHS 
of the second equality in (C4). The first term is always negative. The second term has the sign 
of t x RI   ) (  which is negative except in Pattern B near the boundary where RI increases with t  
and with it the whole term. Thus, the RHS of (C4) may or may not increase at such locations, 
depending on the relative size of the two terms.  
  A similar argument holds for (C5) but with an opposite sign.  
Proof of Lemma 9: 
We obtain (i) in the lemma by differentiating (6) with respect to t  and utilizing the  
Envelope Theorem. When m approaches infinity, AA’s become infinitesimal and therefore 
commuting costs approach zero. The solution then approaches the mixed solution of case two.  An 
informal27 proof of (ii) is as follows: An increase in m implies shorter commuting distances and 
shorter distances for pollution dispersion before concentrations reach residential land use. This 
implies that in two allocations with the same t, overall commuting costs are lower and overall 
concentration levels higher in the allocation with more zones. Since an increase in t is costlier, 
when commuting distances are longer and therefore causes a larger reduction in the surplus, the 
                                                 
27 A formal proof of these statements can be devised along the following lines. Consider (i) in the Lemma. 
Increasing the number of zones while keeping t constant, shortens commuting distances thus the highest values of 
T(x)  are replaced with lower absolute values.  Accordingly the total value of the integral is reduced. 
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&   60 
function  S
* m,t ()  is steeper (has a more negative slope) with respect to t the smaller is m. To 
prove (iii): The smaller is m, the larger is S
* m,0 () , because commuting costs are zero for all m 
while concentrations are lower when m is smaller. 
 
 